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Educating for inquisitiveness:  
A case against exemplarism for intellectual character 
education 
 
One natural application of Linda Zagzebski’s Exemplarist Moral Theory (EMT) (2010, 2017) is 
found in the context of moral character education, as indicated by the present special issue. 
Zagzebski (2017) discusses this application in her recent book (2017, p. 5), commenting that 
‘exemplars can serve as a guide for moral training’ (p. 129) and endorsing ‘the learning of virtue 
by imitation’ (p. 129). This theme has been pursued compellingly by authors working at the 
intersection of virtue ethics and education, contributing to an emerging case for exemplarist 
approaches to character education (Croce & Vaccarezza, 2017; Sundari and Christopher, 2015). I 
explore the applications of EMT to intellectual character education focusing on the intellectual 
virtue of inquisitiveness. I argue that the project of educating for virtuous inquisitiveness 
provides an interesting challenge to the wholesale adoption of exemplarist approaches to 
intellectual character education. Indeed, in the case of virtuous inquisitiveness exemplarism in 
the classroom may be seen to inhibit, rather than promote, the development of intellectually 
virtuous character. This is significant for exemplarist approaches to intellectual character 
education given the distinctive role that inquisitiveness plays in the cultivation of intellectually 
virtuous character. Moreover, it has implications for popular contemporary pedagogical 
strategies such as the ‘Socratic Teaching Method’ (STM). Theorists and practitioners exploring 
exemplarist approaches to intellectual character education should therefore pay attention to the 
special case of virtuous inquisitiveness. 
I. The special case of virtuous inquisitiveness  
The intellectual virtue of inquisitiveness is a primary intellectual virtue to educate for. I have 
defended the primacy of virtuous inquisitiveness in detail elsewhere (Watson, 2016) so will off er 
a summary here. Firstly, inquisitiveness serves as a motivating intellectual virtue: it plays a 
foundational role in the initiation of intellectually virtuous inquiry. More than any others of the 
intellectual virtues, virtuous inquisitiveness gets intellectually virtuous inquiry going. Secondly, 
inquisitiveness bears a distinctive relationship to the intellectual skill of good questioning. I have 
argued elsewhere that good questioning is a necessary component of virtuous inquisitiveness: the 
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virtuously inquisitive person is characteristically motivated and able to engage sincerely in good 
questioning (Watson, 2015). Inquisitiveness can thus be characterized as the ‘question asking 
virtue’. As such, virtuous inquisitiveness encompasses an intellectual skill that is central to the 
development of intellectually virtuous character. Good questioning not only acts as a stimulus to 
intellectually virtuous inquiry but also as a guide for ongoing inquiry and as a valuable tool in the 
cultivation of others of the intellectual virtues such as open-mindedness, intellectual humility and 
intellectual courage (Watson, 2018). Thus, inquisitiveness plays a distinctive role in both the 
initiation of intellectually virtuous inquiry and in the cultivation of intellectually virtuous 
character. It is a primary intellectual virtue to educate for. Given the natural applications of 
exemplarism to character education it is worth examining whether the exemplarist approach can 
be successfully applied in the case of educating for virtuous inquisitiveness.1 
II. Exemplarism in education  
In Chapter 5 of EMT, Zagzebski (2017) discusses the practical applications of exemplarism for 
moral development and moral education. As with the purely theoretical discussion, she maintains 
that the practical applications of exemplarism derive from the central role of the moral emotions, 
and in particular, admiration. Beyond this, however, there is little concrete guidance for the 
would-be practitioner of exemplarist moral or intellectual character education. Zagzebski does 
not propose specific teaching methods or techniques, nor does she outline an overall pedagogical 
strategy. For the most part, it remains an enticing matter for education theorists and practitioners 
to determine which methods or strategies are best suited to inducing admiration for one 
exemplar or another and, moreover, if doing so has a positive impact on moral development.  
One directive on this score comes from Zagzebski’s endorsement of a broadly Aristotelian 
approach to character development that emphasizes ‘the learning of virtue by imitation’ (p. 129). 
Here we are given an insight into a pedagogical strategy that arguably lies at the heart of 
exemplarist education. Key to the development of virtuous character is the imitation (and 
eventual emulation) of the exemplar’s virtuous actions. Zagzebski speaks of an innate ‘imitation 
mechanism’ and writes, ‘There is a multitude of evidence of the way we acquire both behavior 
patterns and desires and emotions from other people’ (p. 130). ‘Emulation,’ she continues, ‘is a 
form of imitation in which the emulated person is perceived as a model in some respect’ (p. 131). 
Imitation is a central feature of the exemplarist approach to character education: virtue is learned 
through the imitation of exemplars. Let us call this the ‘learning by imitation’ model for character 
education. How does this exemplarist approach fare in the case of inquisitiveness? 
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III. Learning inquisitiveness by imitation  
In order to imitate something, one must first observe it. The learning by imitation model 
therefore requires that virtuous behaviour be demonstrated and observed in the classroom. 
Taken at face value, this model can reasonably be interpreted as recommending that teachers 
exhibit virtuous behaviour in the classroom. In this way students are provided with an immediate 
and concrete opportunity to observe the virtues and so to imitate them. As noted, inquisitiveness 
is the question-asking virtue. This means that teachers seeking to exhibit virtuous inquisitiveness 
in the classroom should aim to exhibit good questioning. This is one pedagogical strategy that 
appears to follow from the learning by imitation model for the purpose of cultivating virtuous 
inquisitiveness. It would also appear to stand the exemplarist approach in good stead. At least it 
is uncontroversial to suggest that good teachers ask good questions. Indeed, here the exemplarist 
approach finds significant common ground with educational theory and practice of the past 
decades. Gall (1970), in her comprehensive review of the literature in 1970 maintained that, ‘It is 
a truism for educators that questions play an important role in teaching’ (p. 707). What then does 
research in education and educational psychology tell us about the prospects for an exemplarist 
approach to educating for inquisitiveness based on the learning by imitation model. I will argue 
that, despite a prevalence of teacher questioning, the evidence suggests that students do not 
imitate teacher questioning in the classroom. Consequently, we have reason to doubt the 
eff ectiveness of the learning by imitation model in the case of virtuous inquisitiveness. 
a. Teacher questioning  
Research on teacher questioning has received significant attention in education theory spanning 
several decades (Dantanio & Paradise, 1988; Dillon, 1981, 1982; Gall, 1970, 1984; Grow-
Maienza, Hahn, & Joo, 2001). Much of the literature focuses on measuring teacher questioning 
and its impact on student achievement, including the numbers, types and cognitive level of 
questions asked by teachers (Kleinman, 1965; Martin & Pressley, 1991; Miller & Pressley, 1989; 
Riley, 1981; Wright & Nuthall, 1970). In addition, contributors aim to provide practical guidance 
for teachers on how to incorporate questions into their teaching (Brualdi 1998; Aschner, 1961; 
Farrar, 1983; Guthrie, 1983; Hollingsworth, 1982; Hunkins, 1972; Sachen, 1999). From this we 
can discern a foundational assumption, namely, that teacher questioning is a common 
pedagogical practice. This is reflected in Barbara Gayle, Raymond Preiss and Mike Allen’s(2006) 
survey of the literature in which they note, ‘Most of the advice or pedagogical exploration articles 
written are based on the observation that teachers frequently ask questions in their classrooms’ 
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(p. 281). There is broad consensus on this score. In her 1970 review, Gall cites the following 
results from three independent studies: 
 
“10 primary-grade teachers asked an average of 348 questions each during a school day 
(Floyd, 1960); 12 elementary-school teachers asked an average of 180 questions each in a 
science lesson (Moyer, 1965); and 14 fifth-grade teachers asked an average of 64 questions 
each in a 30-minute social studies lesson (Schreiber, 1967). Furthermore, students are 
exposed to many questions in their textbooks and on examinations.” (Gall, 1970, p. 707)  
 
Twelve years later, Dillon (1982), summarizing further empirical studies, writes ‘It is a well-
documented fact that teachers traditionally ask a lot of questions’ (p. 127). Twenty-four years 
after this, Gayle et al. (2006) echo these results in their review of empirical studies, referring to 
‘the pervasive use of educational questions’ (p. 279). They write: 
 
“Anecdotal and empirical evidence indicates that oral questioning is a fundamental aspect 
of daily classroom interactions. Written questions are common in handouts, assignments, 
projections, Web content, and study guides.” (2006, p. 279)  
 
The results of these empirical studies on teacher questioning are conclusive. The foundational 
assumption—that teacher questioning is a common pedagogical practice —is both 
uncontroversial and unsurprising. But what are the eff ects of this pedagogical practice on 
student behaviour in the classroom. Do students imitate teacher questioning in the way 
suggested and required by the exemplarist learning by imitation model. 
b. Student questioning  
Extensive work by the educational theorist James Dillon throughout the 1980s focused on the 
analysis of student questioning in classrooms (1978, 1981, 1982, 1988). Dillon describes his own 
work as well as reviewing other studies, beginning as early as 1938 (Corey, 1940; Fahey, 1942; 
Houston, 1938; Johns, 1968; Susskind, 1969, 1979; Tizard, Hughes, Carmichael, & Pinkerton, 
1983; Yamamoto, 1962). The results of these studies are as conclusive as those of the studies that 
focus on teacher questioning. They find that students ask very few questions in the classroom. 
Stephen Corey (1940) reports 114 student questions over the course of a week’s observation of 
six senior high classes containing 169 students—less than one question per student. Johns (1968) 
found that student questions accounted for just 2% of the questions asked during observations 
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of six secondary school discussion classes. Dillon’s(1988) study, involving recordings of 27 
discussion classes in six schools, reports an average of two questions per hour from all the 
students in each class, compared with 84 questions per hour from the teacher. Susskind (1969) 
found approximately the same average in a study of primary school classes and reports even 
starker results in a study, 10 years later, involving 32 social studies classes. Summarizing these 
findings, Susskind states: 
 
“To put it baldly, our data indicate that children do not ask questions in school. Given an 
average rate of SQ [student questions] equaling 1.8 per half hour for the entire class, one 
would project that, on the average, an individual student asks a total of 8.3 SQ per year, that 
is 1 SQ per month in all his social studies classes combined.” (Susskind 1979, p. 103)  
 
Dillon summarizes the findings of the studies with similar candor: ‘No one has ever gone into a 
sample of classrooms and found a lot of student questions...investigators can scarcely find any 
student questions’ (p. 199). A later study by Pearson and West (1991) involving observations of 
college age students in 15 college communication classes found that students in these classes 
asked a somewhat higher average of 3.3 questions per hour. The authors nonetheless echo their 
predecessors’ sentiments; ‘the research that is available suggests that students ask far fewer 
questions than might be expected by educators’ (p. 22). The empirical research overwhelmingly 
indicates that students ask relatively few questions in the classroom. Significantly, over and above 
a lack of student questions, the empirical findings indicate a negative correlation between teacher 
questioning and student questioning. A higher rate of teacher questions correlates with a lower 
rate of student questions. Reflecting on the results of his classroom studies, Susskind (1979) 
comments, ‘Clearly, the teacher is the primary initiator, while the student adopts a responsive 
role: the teacher questions, the student replies’ (p. 103). Tizard et al. (1983) likewise comment, 
‘children seem to learn very quickly that their role at school is to answer, not to ask questions’ (p. 
279). Dillon picks this up noting: 
 
“Observers from various perspectives have described classroom discourse as a series of 
three-part exchanges, principally a teacher question, a pupil response, and a teacher 
comment—plus a further question”. (1982, p. 128) 
 
Dillon (1982) cites socio-linguistic research that refers to this dynamic as “an exponential law of 
successive questioning”, whereby the chances at any point are two to one that a teacher will ask a 
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question’ (p. 128). A study by the psychologist Mishler (1975), based on recordings of four 
primary classrooms across the course of a school year found that in 85% of the exchanges 
between teachers and students, teachers were heard to ask a further question after a student had 
responded to an initial question and in 67% of exchanges teachers were heard to respond to 
student questions by asking another question. Simply put, teachers ask questions and students 
answer them.  
 
Such low rates of student questioning may at first seem surprising. However, on reflection, it is 
not all that surprising to find that teacher questioning leads to student answering. This is so 
simply in virtue of the natural question-answer dynamic. When a teacher poses a question her 
students are placed in the position of answerers, not questioners. They are asked to provide 
answers, not questions and encouraged to refine their answering, as opposed to questioning, 
skills. The more questions a teacher asks, the more often she places her students in the position 
of answerers as opposed to questioners, reducing the opportunities for student questioning to 
arise. We have seen that teachers ask a lot of questions in classrooms. Given question–answer 
dynamics, it is natural to find that students ask very few questions as a result. In short, teacher 
questioning inhibits, rather than promotes student questioning in the classroom.  
 
This conclusion exposes a tension between the exemplarist learning by imitation model and the 
successful cultivation of virtuous inquisitiveness in the classroom. According to the learning by 
imitation model, teachers should demonstrate virtuous inquisitiveness in order for students to 
observe and imitate it. This requires teachers to exhibit good questioning. But, when a teacher 
exhibits questioning (of any kind) in the classroom she places her students in the position of 
answerers. Rather than learning to imitate the teacher’s questions, students become ever more 
adept at answering them. In order to learn and practice virtuous inquisitiveness, however, 
students must be allowed to take up positions as questioners in their educational environments, 
enabling them to develop and refine their questioning skills. The evidence suggests that they do 
not do this when teachers are asking the questions: students do not imitate teacher questions, 
they answer them. Consequently, while virtuous inquisitiveness is no doubt a trait that many 
would want to find in teachers, by exhibiting this trait in the classroom teachers risk inhibiting 
the progress of their students towards developing it themselves. In the case of virtuous 
inquisitiveness, we have reason to doubt the eff ectiveness of the exemplarist learning by 
imitation model. 
IV. An objection  
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I have taken the learning by imitation model to be a central component of the exemplarist 
approach based largely on Zagzebski’s(2017) comment in Chapter 5 of EMT, when introducing 
the theory’s practical applications, that her ‘focus is on the learning of virtue by imitation’ (p. 
129). She goes on to cite a number of studies illustrating the significance of imitation in 
prompting virtuous actions. Zagzebski’s use of these studies to demonstrate the relationship 
between imitation and virtuous action supports the idea that imitation is meant to be playing a 
central role when it comes to applying exemplarism to moral education. As noted, Zagzebski 
does not off er explicit pedagogical strategies and as such it remains a question for educational 
theorists and practitioners to apply and test the theory. It seems plausible that the learning by 
imitation model is at least one key to converting exemplarism into pedagogical practice for the 
purposes of character education.  
 
However, one might worry that my interpretation of this model has been too crude. It does not, 
for example, necessarily follow from the learning by imitation model that teachers themselves 
can or should be expected to exhibit the exemplary behaviours they hope to cultivate in the 
classroom. Rather, one might argue, exemplarism requires a less direct approach, one in which 
teachers present and stimulate discussion of exemplary figures, either from history, in 
contemporary life, or through fictional narratives, rather than exhibiting exemplary behaviour 
themselves. Zagzebski places an emphasis on the role of narratives for instructional purposes 
throughout EMT so this interpretation of how exemplarism would play out in an education 
context seems warranted. There is not space to discuss the possible benefits of this more indirect 
form of exemplarism for character education here. In response to the present worry, however, it 
is worth considering the implications of denying the centrality of the more direct version in the 
form of the learning by imitation model.  
 
One of the most compelling features of exemplarism is the suggestion that we should take 
seriously the role that exemplary individuals’ actions, behaviour and character play in the 
development and cultivation of the virtues. This has practical applications for character 
education, as indicated not least of all by the present volume. If we discount the role of teachers 
as everyday exemplars in the classroom, however, the practical applications of exemplarism for 
character education would be significantly more limited. Teachers will no doubt find numerous 
creative and inspiring ways to introduce students to exemplars and may, in doing so, succeed in 
promoting admiration of the various moral and intellectual virtues exhibited by these exemplary 
individuals. But do we not also want teachers themselves to demonstrate virtuous character in 
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their classrooms so that students are exposed to concrete, immediate and everyday instances of 
the virtues, promoting and inspiring admiration along the way. Many of us reflecting on our own 
education no doubt remember those few special teachers who ultimately inspired just this kind 
of admiration in us. Brogan and Brogan (1995) highlight this point, quoting also, in part, 
Theodore Sizer (1992): 
 
“This is why, when we ask our student teachers to describe their own favorite teachers, they 
invariably speak in glowing terms about how they admired this “person” and the love of 
learning embodied in this person, and how much their lives were “influenced” by this 
intellectually based relationship.” (Brogan & Brogan, 1995, p. 291)  
 
It would be a strange result if adopting an exemplarist approach to character education meant 
dismissing or discouraging the role of teachers as models for the cultivation of students’ moral or 
intellectual character. This provides further reason for taking the learning by imitation model to 
be a central aspect of converting exemplarism into pedagogical practice. If this interpretation is 
accurate, however, as I have argued, we have reason to doubt the eff ectiveness of exemplarism 
for the purposes of cultivating virtuous inquisitiveness in the classroom. 
V. Pedagogical implications  
What are the pedagogical implications of this conclusion. The empirical evidence I have cited, 
while both extensive and conclusive, is nonetheless outdated. Interest among education 
researchers in questions and questioning experienced a surge in the 1970s and 1980s. This 
interest subsided during the 1990s and has not yet regained momentum. As such, much of the 
research I have drawn on is 40- to 50-years-old including most of the empirical studies. Given 
how much the landscape of education can and does change over the course of several decades, 
one can reasonably ask whether claims about the relative frequency of teacher and student 
questions in the classroom still hold true. This is a legitimate concern. Note, that it does not 
aff ect the conclusion of the argument itself but rather raises a question about what pedagogical 
implications follow from that conclusion in a contemporary setting. In its own right, the 
conclusion that the learning by imitation model is not eff ective in the case of virtuous 
inquisitiveness, does not rely on whether or not the empirical results of the 1970s and 1980s hold 
true in the classrooms of today. The data provides support for the conclusion, in principle, 
irrespective of when it was collected. Nonetheless, if we want to cultivate virtuous inquisitiveness 
in the classroom this conclusion has a practical upshot. Teacher questioning will inhibit the 
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development of virtuous inquisitiveness in students. Thus, we should seek to discourage teacher 
questioning in the classroom. However, if it turns out, contrary to the empirical evidence of the 
1970s and 1980s, that students are the primary question-askers in contemporary classrooms, this 
practical intervention will be redundant. While the conclusion itself remains unchanged, there 
would be little reason for education theorists or practitioners to act upon it and the pedagogical 
implications would be trivial.  
 
There is, however, evidence to suggest that the relative frequencies of teacher and student 
questions have not changed so dramatically over the past 50 years so as to have been significantly 
altered or, indeed, reversed. Perhaps most tellingly we can look to the continuing production of 
instructional resources for teachers on how to use questions in the classroom. These are certainly 
no less abundant (and almost certainly more so) than they were in the 1970s and 1980s. Take, for 
example, Dantanio and Beisenherz (2001) Learning to Question, Questioning to Learn: 
Developing Eff ective Teacher Questioning Practices, Esther Fusco’s(2012) Eff ective 
Questioning Strategies in the Classroom, Gordon Pope’s(2013) Questioning Technique 
Pocketbook, Mike Gershon’s (2013) How to use Questioning in the Classroom: The Complete 
Guide and Peter Worley’s 100 Ideas for Primary Teachers: Questioning (2019). This incomplete 
list indicates that teacher questioning is still a common, and widely endorsed pedagogical 
practice. Against this background, the pedagogical implications of the conclusion we have 
arrived at are more significant. The upshot that we should discourage, rather than promote, 
teacher questioning in the classroom looks to be going against the grain.  
 
To explore the pedagogical implications of our conclusion in more depth, it will be instructive to 
examine a specific teaching strategy popular among contemporary education theorists and 
practitioners. This strategy is variously labelled “Socratic Teaching”, “Socratic Questioning”, 
“The Socratic Method” and so on. I will refer to it as the “Socratic Teaching Method” (STM). In 
essence, the STM is a teaching strategy aimed at stimulating and facilitating classroom discussion. 
Over and above this, advocates of the STM assert a number of benefits including “sharpen[ing] 
participants” critical thinking skills’ (Piro and Anderson, 2015, p. 279), developing “convergent 
and divergent thinking” (Brogan & Brogan, 1995, p. 296) and “inculcating the spirit of inquiry 
and the love of learning in ... students” (Brogan & Brogan, 1995, p. 289). This latter is the benefit 
perhaps most consistently cited by advocates and practitioners of the STM in its various forms. 
Richard Paul and Linda Elder, founders of the US-based Foundation For Critical Thinking, write 
of the STM: “In Socratic teaching we focus on giving students questions, not answers. We model 
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an inquiring, probing mind by continually probing into the subject with questions.” 
[http://www.criticalthinking.org/pages/socratic-teaching/606. Accessed: 21 July 2018]. Dillon 
(1980) captures this goal of the STM succinctly: “One of the purposes for this questioning is 
presumably to stimulate curiosity and inquiry in the student” (p. 17). Brogan and Brogan (1995) 
make the point even more overtly when they conclude their discussion of the benefits of the 
STM: 
“We must make training in eff ective questioning an important part of teacher education 
and professional development. We cannot give first order thinking to students, but we 
can give them the gift of the question and the spirit of inquiry—prerequisites for 
thinking.” (Brogan & Brogan, 1995, p. 296) 
 
This consensus regarding the eff ects of the STM suggests that the STM can be viewed as a 
version of the exemplarist learning by imitation model. Practitioners of the STM aim to promote 
an inquiring mind in their students by modelling it themselves.  
 
In a recent paper, Croce and Vaccarezza (2017) argue for a “pluralist exemplar-based approach 
to moral education”. According to this approach, exemplarist moral education may focus either 
on the cultivation of moral character as a whole, through exposure to moral saints, or on the 
cultivation of individual virtues, through exposure to moral heroes (persons who demonstrate 
just one virtue to an exceptional degree). The project of educating for virtuous inquisitiveness is 
at least prima facie an individual virtue cultivation project. Assuming that Croce and 
Vaccarezza’s argument extends to the domain of intellectual character, an exemplarist approach 
to educating for virtuous inquisitiveness might therefore be expected to do so via exposure to 
intellectual heroes who demonstrate virtuous inquisitiveness to an exceptional degree. The STM 
could be considered just this type of approach. Socrates is viewed as an exemplar of 
inquisitiveness, a kind of hero for philosophical inquiry. The STM takes Socrates as a central 
inspiration for pedagogical practice and holds him up as the exemplar for a particular model of 
inquiry. As such, the STM can be viewed as an (unintentional) version of the exemplarist 
learning by imitation model; one that is in practice in contemporary education.  
 
So what does our conclusion recommend for practitioners of the STM. Simply put, insofar as 
teachers aim to cultivate inquisitiveness through the STM, they should refrain from posing 
questions. Rather students should be encouraged to develop and frame their own questions, 
placing the teacher in the position of answerer. This is one way to ensure that students are given 
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the opportunities they need to practice and refine their questioning, rather than answering skills. 
Happily, the STM is just the kind of pedagogical practice that can incorporate this 
recommendation given its explicitly dialogical nature. Indeed, many teachers who use the STM 
aim to adopt it in precisely this way. The conclusion I have defended here, however, highlights 
the significance of using the STM as a platform for student, rather than teacher questioning, and 
so as a means of reducing instances of teacher questions in the classroom. This runs contrary to 
the extensive pedagogical literature that focuses on uses of teacher questioning. As long as the 
STM represents an (unintentional) form of exemplarism in which teachers seek to model good 
questioning, it will not be an eff ective means of cultivating virtuous inquisitiveness in students. 
Indeed, this recommendation extends to pedagogical practice more broadly, beyond the STM. If 
teachers want to encourage good questioning in their students, they should ask less questions 
themselves.  
 
One could argue that this recommendation is too strong. The conclusion above is based on 
evidence of a negative correlation between teacher and student questioning. However, all that 
has been demonstrated is that teacher questioning inhibits student questioning in the classroom 
by placing students in the position of answerers. It remains possible that students nonetheless 
learn to model teachers’ good questions outside of this context and so do, in fact, come to 
develop virtuous inquisitiveness via the learning by imitation model.2 This objection brings to 
the fore an underlying pedagogical foundation for the recommendation; one that, much like 
exemplarism itself, draws on a broadly Aristotelian approach. I am assuming that the intellectual 
virtues are, at least to some extent, developed by practicing and refining the relevant intellectual 
skills. Much like learning to play the piano, for example, requires practice, so too does learning to 
be virtuously inquisitive. Perhaps a student could learn to play the piano by merely observing her 
teacher playing it but it is uncontroversial to suggest that a more eff ective strategy is for the 
teacher to guide the student as she attempts to play it herself. So too in the case of 
inquisitiveness, where the relevant intellectual skill is good questioning. Students who are not 
given opportunities in the classroom to practice and refine the skill of good questioning, but 
instead merely observe good teacher questioning, are correspondingly not given (as many) 
opportunities to practice being virtuously inquisitive. Assuming that practice does have a 
substantive role to play in virtue development, then these students will also be less likely to 
develop virtuous inquisitiveness in the classroom. The recommendation, therefore, amounts to a 
call for pedagogical practices that explicitly provide these opportunities for practice and 
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refinement by reducing teacher questioning and deliberately and consistently placing students in 
the position of questioners in their classroom interactions.  
 
Importantly, this is not to say that good teacher questioning has no positive eff ects on student 
learning. At most the education research suggests that more (or perhaps diff erent) contemporary 
empirical work is needed in order to establish a firm case either for or against the use of teacher 
questioning as a pedagogical strategy. Rather, my aim here has been to determine whether good 
teacher questioning leads to good student questioning. The conclusion I have defended is that it 
does not. This is significant for the exemplarist approach to educating for virtuous 
inquisitiveness based on the learning by imitation model. If students do not learn to be good 
questioners by imitating teacher questioning, then they cannot learn to be virtuously inquisitive 
through this mechanism either. This leaves open the possibility that they can learn to be 
virtuously inquisitive by some other, less direct mechanism. Perhaps students learn something 
about the value of an inquisitive frame-of-mind from their question-asking teachers. But the 
learning by imitation model, which Zagzebski (2017) describes as her focus for applying 
exemplarism to moral education, will not in and of itself succeed in educating for virtuous 
inquisitiveness. I have argued that it may in fact inhibit students from developing the virtue and 
have explored the pedagogical implications of this. 
VI. Conclusion  
I take the tension I have identified to be idiosyncratic to the case of educating for virtuous 
inquisitiveness. The tension arises from a distinctive feature of the virtue, namely, the defining 
role of good questioning and from the distinctive and unavoidable question–answer dynamic. It 
is in virtue of this dynamic that the eff ectiveness of the exemplarist approach to educating for 
the virtue is brought into question. The same cannot be said about the task of educating for any 
of the other individual intellectual virtues given that they are not (at least not obviously) defined 
by good questioning. Likewise, for the moral virtues which are even less obviously defined (or 
related to) good questioning, and at the same time, are arguably the more explicit target of 
current or future attempts to apply exemplarism to character education. As such, the conclusion 
of this article cannot and does not intend to speak to the project of applying exemplarist 
approaches to character education, in the broadest sense. There is no doubt plenty of worthwhile 
theoretical and practical work for education researchers to do in order to test and substantiate 
the idea that exemplarism can and should be used as a tool for the cultivation of virtuous 
character in schools. That being said, the article does have a general point to make about the 
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wholesale adoption of an exemplarist approach to intellectual character education. That is insofar 
as the task of educating for intellectually virtuous character relies centrally on the success of 
educating for virtuous inquisitiveness. I have argued here that inquisitiveness is a primary 
intellectual virtue to educate for. As such, over and above exposing the specific issues that arise 
from applying exemplarism to the cultivation of virtuous inquisitiveness, my aim has been to 
highlight the significance of this idiosyncratic case for exemplarist approaches to intellectual 
character education. The case of inquisitiveness, while idiosyncratic, is nonetheless significant in 
virtue of the distinctive role that inquisitiveness plays in the initiation of intellectually virtuous 
inquiry and in the cultivation of intellectually virtuous character, including others of the 
individual intellectual virtues such as attentiveness and intellectual humility. As such, theorists 
concerned with developing an exemplarist approach to intellectual character education in 
practice should pay close attention to the interesting and divergent case of virtuous 
inquisitiveness. 
 
Notes 
1. This characterisation of inquisitiveness identifies both a motivational and a skill component of 
the virtue, in line with Zagzebski (1996). For reasons of space, I will focus on development of 
the skill component in what follows, namely the skill of good questioning. I take both the 
motivational and skill components to be necessary for exhibiting virtuous inquisitiveness so if it 
is the case, as I will argue, that the exemplarist approach inhibits good questioning in the 
classroom, then this is sufficient to show that the exemplarist approach inhibits the development 
of virtuous inquisitiveness. Nonetheless, there is substantially more that could be said in an 
examination of the eff ects of exemplarism for the motivational component, which may be quite 
diff erent.  
2. Thanks to an anonymous referee for highlighting this. 
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